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A. Introduction
1 Design rights represent an interesting example of 
how the EU legislature has successfully regulated 
an otherwise heterogeneous field of law. Yet this 
type of protection is not for all. The tools created 
by EU intervention have been drafted paying much 
more attention to the industry sector rather than 
to designers themselves. In particular, modern, 
Abstract:  Design rights represent an interest-
ing example of how the EU legislature has success-
fully regulated an otherwise heterogeneous field of 
law. Yet this type of protection is not for all. The tools 
created by EU intervention have been drafted paying 
much more attention to the industry sector rather 
than to designers themselves. In particular, modern, 
digitally based, individual or small-sized, 3D print-
ing, open designers and their needs are largely ne-
glected by such legislation. There is obviously noth-
ing wrong in drafting legal tools around the needs 
of an industrial sector with an important role in the 
EU economy, on the contrary, this is a legitimate and 
good decision of industrial policy. However, good leg-
islation should be fair, balanced, and (technologically) 
neutral in order to offer suitable solutions to all the 
players in the market, and all the citizens in the soci-
ety, without discriminating the smallest or the new-
est: the cost would be to stifle innovation. The use of 
printing machinery to manufacture physical objects 
created digitally thanks to computer programs such 
as Computer-Aided Design (CAD) software has been 
in place for quite a few years, and it is actually the 
standard in many industrial fields, from aeronautics 
to home furniture. The change in recent years that 
has the  potential to be a paradigm-shifting factor 
is a combination between the opularization of such 
technologies (price, size, usability, quality) and the dif-
fusion of a culture based on access to and reuse of 
knowledge. We will call this blend Open Design. It is 
probably still too early, however, to say whether 3D 
printing will be used in the future to refer to a major 
event in human history, or instead will be relegated to 
a lonely Wikipedia entry similarly to ³Betamax² (copy-
right scholars are familiar with it for other reasons). 
It is not too early, however, to develop a legal analy-
sis that will hopefully contribute to clarifying the ma-
jor issues found in current EU design law structure, 
why many modern open designers will probably find 
better protection in copyright, and whether they can 
successfully rely on open licenses to achieve their 
goals. With regard to the latter point, we will use Cre-
ative Commons (CC) licenses to test our hypothesis 
due to their unique characteristic to be modular, i.e. 
to have different license elements (clauses) that li-
censors can choose in order to adapt the license to 
their own needs.”
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digitally based, individual or small-sized, 3D print-
ing, open designers and their needs are largely ne-
glected by such legislation. The absence in the whole 
legal framework of a clear definition of the word 
“designer” is a first warning. Another can be taken 
in the amount of Recitals making reference to the 
needs of the industrial sector in the Community De-
sign Regulation, including 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 25.1 
Individual designers find some recognition only in 
Recitals 7 and 24. This is certainly not a conclusive 
argument by itself, but it is quite symptomatic of the 
level of the debate during the drafting phase.
2  The historical moment when this legislation was 
drafted (the Green Paper is from 19912) offers only 
a partial justification. It is true that this was a time 
when products of industrial design meant industri-
ally based enterprises, and where the state of the 
technology, its costs, and dissemination did not al-
low individual designers, or even small enterprises, 
to play a relevant role. However, the equation seems 
inversely proportional: the technology evolved from 
1998 (the year of the Design Directive) to 2002 (the 
year of the Design Regulation), giving wider access to 
individual designers, but their relevance in the stat-
utes did not evolve accordingly. On the contrary, the 
needs of the industrial sector found a sounder rec-
ognition in the most recent legislation.
3  There is obviously nothing wrong in drafting legal 
tools around the needs of an industrial sector with 
an important role in the EU economy; on the con-
trary, this is a legitimate and good decision of indus-
trial policy. However, good legislation should be fair, 
general, and (technologically) neutral in order to of-
fer suitable solutions to all the players in the market 
and all the citizens in the society, without discrim-
inating against the smallest or the newest. Failure 
to fulfil this commonly accepted public policy goal 
would represent an obstacle for innovation. 
4 Thanks to technological evolution, the role of small 
and individual players in the game of design has 
grown exponentially without the law apparently 
being able to catch the shift or the consequences 
it entails.
5  Nowadays, the situation in technological terms is 
diametrically different from the time when EU de-
sign law was enacted, as witnessed by “personal” 3D 
printing solutions and the number of projects imple-
menting them.3 The proportions of the relationship 
recall IBM’s 1970 data processing units that occupied 
entire rooms contrasted with today’s tablets.
6  The use of printing machinery to manufacture phys-
ical objects created digitally thanks to computer pro-
grams such as Computer-Aided Design (CAD) soft-
ware has been in place for quite a few years, and it is 
actually the standard in many industrial fields, from 
aeronautics to home furniture. The change in recent 
years that has the potential to be a paradigm-shift-
ing factor is a combination between the populariza-
tion of such technologies (price, size, usability, qual-
ity) and the diffusion of a culture based on access to 
and reuse of knowledge.4 We will call this blend Open 
Design.5
7  Many Open Design supporters argue that 3D print-
ing technology and mass customization can be seen 
as the cornerstone of a third industrial revolution,6 
much like the steam engine and the spinning mule 
were for the first, and mass production and stand-
ardization for the second.7 3D printing has an end-
less number of possible applications, from food to 
aerospace, from biotech to jewellery. In particular, 
Open Source 3D printing – i.e. the use of 3D print-
ers created and licensed following the FLOSS model 
– promise the achievement of economically efficient 
distributed manufacturing models that will reduce ship-
ping and storage costs, improve efficiency of the af-
fected economic sectors, create new markets and 
new forms of social interaction, and reduce pollu-
tion (such as that connected with shipment).8 
8 As it has already happened in the past, when legis-
lative interventions fail to recognize new techno-
logical, economic, and business needs, social change 
happens and new forms creation and dissemination 
flourish beyond, or in spite of the law. It is funda-
mental, from a policy point of view, not to turn this 
social change form beyond to against the law. From a 
legal point of view, a careful balancing of the differ-
ent rights and interests at stake can lead to shared 
solutions that empower institutions, stake holders, 
citizens and global welfare. From an economic point 
of view, turning thousands or millions of potential 
customers into transgressors can hardly be seen as 
a good business plan.
9  It is probably still too early, however, to say whether 
3D printing will be used in the future to refer to a 
major event in human history, or instead will be rel-
egated to a lonely Wikipedia entry similarly to “Bet-
amax” (copyright scholars are familiar with it for 
other reasons). It is not too early, however, to de-
velop a legal analysis that will hopefully contribute 
to clarifying the major issues found in current EU 
design law structure, why many modern open de-
signers will probably find better protection in cop-
yright, and whether they can successfully rely on 
open licenses to achieve their goals. With regard to 
the latter point, we will use Creative Commons (CC) 
licenses to test our hypothesis due to their unique 
characteristic to be modular, i.e. to have different li-
cense elements (clauses) that licensors can choose 
in order to adapt the license to their own needs.9 
CC licenses are already employed in a number of 3D 
projects.10
10  It must be borne in mind, however, that other le-
gal tools may play an important role in the protec-
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tion of products of design, such as patents, models 
and trademarks (especially three-dimensional trade-
marks). Nonetheless, a thorough analysis of such 
aspects would exceed the scope of this work, and 
therefore they are not addressed here.11 This anal-
ysis is from a EU perspective: Copyright and maybe 
even more design rights may operate quite differ-
ently in extra EU jurisdictions12.
11  The structure of the paper is as follows: Part I deals 
with legislative-based protection and its interpreta-
tion by courts. In this part, after this short introduc-
tion (section 1), we will analyse the relevant EU de-
sign law provisions (section 2) and copyright (section 
3), with some brief but interesting national exam-
ples. Part II of the paper is dedicated to what we can 
do to fix the EU legal framework available to prod-
ucts of design. We start by outlining the most rele-
vant aspects of CC licenses in section 4. In section 5 
we try to understand how these licenses apply, if at 
all, to products of design, and whether the resulting 
structure can lead to a working legal framework for 
Open Design. In our conclusions (section 6), we in-
dicate that a first superficial answer is negative. CC 
licenses are copyright licenses and it is not possible 
to expand their scope to include design rights. How-
ever, a more detailed answer is not that straight-
forward, and even if CC licenses and design rights 
remain two different and incompatible legal instru-
ments, given the specific features of each one, it is 
arguably possible to combine them in order to cre-
ate a legal framework for the development of Open 
Design under the name of CC-Plus-Design.
B. Design rights in the EU
12 The attention that the EU legislator has directed to 
the field of design led to the enactment of two im-
portant pieces of legislation: the Design Directive 
(DD)13 and the Community Design Regulation (CDR).14
13  The DD of 1998, the oldest of the two, was enacted 
with the goal of harmonizing the – sometimes sig-
nificantly heterogeneous – national legislations of 
Member States in the field of registered design prod-
ucts. The CDR, in force since 2002, possesses the dif-
ferent objective of creating a unified system of pro-
tection for design products at the EU level, and along 
with the registered option (Registered Community 
Design, RCD) offers an unregistered form of protec-
tion (Unregistered Community Design, UCD). The 
DD harmonizes only in the field of registered design 
(and within this field only substantive and not proce-
dural rules), and does not create (but  does not pre-
clude the survival at the national level of) any form 
of unregistered design scheme.15
14  In light of such double-tier protection, the options 
available to a hypothetical European-based designer 
are twofold. First, a national registered form of pro-
tection based on common substantive law princi-
ples throughout the EU – procedural rules regarding 
registration and maintenance can in fact vary from 
country to country. National registration offers pro-
tection only for the national territory where regis-
tration is filed,16 in addition to the usual terms of pri-
ority offered on the basis of the Paris Convention.17
15  Second, the designer can opt for a community design 
protection, register her design through the OHIP18 
registrar office and obtain an EU-wide legal title that 
protects her design in the whole EU. A key aspect 
of the CDR is the unitary character of protection, 
which mandates that a community design shall have 
equal effect throughout the Community and can-
not be registered, transferred or surrendered or be 
the subject of a decision declaring it invalid, nor can 
its use be prohibited, save in respect of the whole 
Community.19
16  If the designer does not register her design at any 
level, she can still enjoy a three-year unregistered 
(UCD) protection which can operate regardless of 
any other form of national unregistered design pro-
tection. Such an eventuality is observed in the UK, 
for example, where an unregistered form of protec-
tion was available long before the CDR; it still sur-
vives and offers some limited advantages over the 
UCD.20
17  Regarding the substantive law aspects, it can be ob-
served that the DD and the CDR create an almost 
identical set of provisions, and therefore, unless oth-
erwise noted, the analysis, albeit focusing on the 
CDR, reflects this identity.21
I. Definitions and requirements 
for protection
18 Article 3 CDR defines two major concepts in design 
law: design and product. Combining the two defi-
nitions and removing the list of examples therein 
contained, it emerges that the protection offered 
to products of design covers “the appearance of the 
whole or a part of … any industrial or handicraft item 
resulting from the features of the product itself … 
and/or its ornamentation”.
19  The types of features Article 3 enumerates include 
lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials.22 
The definition of products includes parts intended to 
be assembled into a complex product, packaging, get-up, 
graphic symbols and typographic typefaces, but exclud-
ing computer programs.23 Pivotal to the definition of 
what is protected is indeed the concept of “appear-
ance”, which has to be construed broadly as con-
firmed by the non-exhaustive list of elements that 
qualifies it. This definition, has been said, should be 
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broad enough to “encapsulate any economic value 
that is attached to the appearance of the product”.24 
20  Given such a generous definition, it is possible to in-
clude in the scope of protection of the CDR both 2D[i-
mensional] (e.g. ornaments) and 3D[imensional] (e.g. 
shapes) products in a huge variety of conformations. 
As has been expressed, it is a much easier exercise 
to focus on the aspects that are explicitly excluded 
from the definition than on those that could be po-
tentially included.25 Of particular relevance among 
the items explicitly excluded from registration: blue-
prints for houses or other architectural plans di-
rected to a house (though they can be registered as 
“other printed matters” following the Locarno clas-
sification26), a single colour as such, mere verbal el-
ements (words per se), music and sounds (but not 
their graphical representation registrable as “other 
printed matters”) and living plants.27
21  Fragrances and smells were listed as another ex-
clusion item by Musker, but in the consulted Man-
ual there is no sign of them anymore.28 Suthersanen 
suggests that given the definition of design – which 
is strongly linked to the concept of appearance of 
a product, and therefore to a visual dimension – it 
would be unlikely that a court would expand the 
definition to protect characteristics such as sound 
or smell.29 This interpretation is supported by many 
commentators, although some point out that even 
though the CDR30 and the Green Paper31 strongly fo-
cus on the visual dimension of the concept of appear-
ance, therefore excluding sounds and smell from this 
notion, references in Article 3 to texture and material 
imply that touch may be an important attribute of a 
design.32 Process design and service design seems to 
fall squarely outside the protection afforded by CDR 
as there is no industrial or handicraft product iden-
tifiable.33 Interior and exterior design do not seem 
to be directed to a product either, though it is con-
sidered protectable by some scholars.34 Web design 
appears to be a borderline category. On the one side, 
the appearance of a website (eliminating sounds, and 
reducing it down to what can be filed as support-
ing documentation at the OHIM office, therefore ex-
cluding also dynamic elements) seems not to differ 
significantly from the appearance of, say, a book’s 
front cover. However, “product” is strictly defined 
as an industrial or handicraft item, and under this 
point of view it should be impossible for web design 
to meet such a definition. It seems, therefore, that 
web design in general should be excluded from pro-
tection, with the exception of computer icons and 
graphic user interfaces (GUI), for which there is a 
specific, though only indirect, provision. GUI and 
computer icons usually do not form part of the un-
derlying computer program, an aspect that disqual-
ifies them from the exclusion granted to software.35 
This is, however, an extremely contentious issue (see 
infra).36
22  Nonetheless, not all the designs that conform with 
the – overly broad – definition outlined above can 
be protected. Two key requirements need to be met: 
novelty and individual character.37
II. Novelty and individual character
23 Novelty is defined by Article 5 CDR, which man-
dates that no other “identical design” must have 
been made available to the public before the date 
on which the design for which protection is claimed 
was first made available to the public (for UCD); or 
before the date of filing of the application for regis-
tration of the design for which protection is claimed; 
or if priority is claimed, the date of priority (for RCD). 
The body of designs constituting the prior art, i.e. the 
threshold against which novelty needs to be tested, 
is defined in detailed by Article 7 in a way that sig-
nificantly reduces the broadness of Article 5 (and of 
Article 6, see below). Such details include territorial, 
business sectors, confidentiality- and intentionali-
ty-related issues to an extent that “the broad, ob-
jective novelty notion [is transformed] into a pecu-
liar and complex form of local novelty”.38
24  Section 2 of the same article briefly describes the 
concept of being identical and stipulates that iden-
tity has to be found when the features of two designs 
differ only in immaterial details.39 Therefore, in or-
der to be considered new, a design has to look dif-
ferent in material details from everything that has 
been produced before, regardless of whether the de-
signer has copied from any prior art.40
25  The second requirement to be met in order to enjoy 
CDR protection is the individual character. Article 
6 explains that in order to possess individual char-
acter, the design must produce an overall impres-
sion on the informed user that is different from the 
overall impression produced on such a user by any 
design which has been made available to the public 
before the relevant date (i.e. before the date it was 
first made available to the public for UCD or before 
the date of filing or priority for RCD).
26 Section 2 of the Article indicates that the degree of 
freedom of the designer in developing the design 
shall be taken into consideration in assessing the re-
quirement. In order to establish the individual char-
acter, the standard reference is the “informed user”. 
This informed user has been defined “as particu-
larly observant and [with] some awareness of the 
state of the prior art, that is to say the previous de-
signs relating to the product in question”.41 The in-
formed user is a concept that lies somewhere in be-
tween that of the average consumer – applicable in 
trade mark matters – who needs not have any spe-
cific knowledge and who makes no direct compar-
ison between the trade marks in conflict, and the 
sectorial expert, who is an expert with detailed tech-
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nical expertise (somehow closer to the person skilled 
in the art found in patent law42). Therefore, the con-
cept of the informed user refers not to a user of av-
erage attention – this is a particularly observant one, 
either because of his personal experience or his ex-
tensive knowledge of the sector in question – but it 
is still a user, not an expert in the sector.43
27  In light of this connotation of the threshold for the 
informed user, it is necessary to clarify the con-
nected standard of overall impression. As the expres-
sion suggests, all the features of the design should be 
taken into account to perform this comparison, al-
though the comparison is based exclusively on what 
is visible to the informed users during normal use, 
therefore excluding features that are not visible or 
are only under special circumstances.44
28 Excluded from the overall impression test shall also 
be those features that are entirely dictated by tech-
nical function, in accordance with the same Article 
8. An important parameter to determine the indi-
vidual character is the freedom of the designer. The 
more a design is pre-determined by technical con-
ditions, the smaller the possibility for its design to 
diverge from a given pattern. In light of this, a de-
sign which could seem as not creating a different 
overall impression on the informed user (a given 
design is too similar to existing prior art) could af-
ter all be protected since it should create a differ-
ent overall impression on the informed user who is 
aware of the technical constraint.45 The other face 
of the coin of such limited designer freedom is the 
limited protection that applies in this specific case 
in light of Article 10(2) CDR, which states that in as-
sessing the scope of protection, the degree of free-
dom of the designer in developing his design shall 
be taken into consideration.46
29  Once established that in order to possess individual 
character a design should produce an overall impres-
sion on an informed user which is different from that 
produced on her by the existing design corpus, we 
should enquire how different this overall impression 
should be. As a hermeneutic tool, we are helped by 
Recital 14 CDR, which establishes that the difference 
needs to be clear.47 Therefore, only if a design’s over-
all impression on an informed user clearly differs from 
that produced on him by the existing design corpus, 
will the design possess an individual character and 
be protected, although this qualification (clearly) is 
only present in the mentioned Recital and not car-
ried over into the wording of Article 6.48 This view, 
expressed in detail by the UK Court of Appeal, has 
been only partially successful among commentators 
(for a detailed discussion, see infra).49
30  As for the type of prior art contemplated by the CDR, 
Article 7 indicates that we are in the presence of an 
absolute novelty requirement. In fact, any form of 
disclosure is accepted in order to create prior art and 
destroy novelty. The Article states that for the pur-
pose of Articles 5 (novelty) and 6 (individual char-
acter), a design shall be deemed to have been made 
available to the public if it has been legitimately (i.e. 
in the absence of any abuse or breach of confidence) 
published following registration or otherwise, or ex-
hibited, used in trade or otherwise disclosed before 
the relevant date (which is indicated respectively at 
Articles 5(1)(a)&(b) and 6(1)(a)&(b)). However, this 
absolute prior art test is considerably reduced in sig-
nificance by a list of exceptions.
31  Previous disclosures, in fact, do not destroy novelty 
when the aforementioned events (publication, exhi-
bition, use in trade, etc.) could not reasonably have 
become known in the normal course of business to 
the circles specialized in the sector concerned, op-
erating within the Community.50 Another major ex-
ception is represented by the 12-month grace period 
set forth by Article 7(2), during which the disclosure 
is excused. In the present case, the making availa-
ble to the public needs to be occasioned by the de-
signer, her successor in title, or even a third party, 
but as the result of information or actions of the de-
signer. As said, under these conditions, and only dur-
ing a period of 12 months, is such making available to 
the public deemed irrelevant towards both novelty 
and individual character tests, with the consequence 
that the designer is still entitled to file an applica-
tion for registration. During this 12-month period 
(and for the following 24), the design will most likely 
be protected by UCD, which offers protection to the 
designer against acts of copying. Accordingly, a 
third-party independent application for an identi-
cal design to the one subject to the 12-month grace 
period would be rejected for lack of novelty, while 
a corresponding use (i.e. the use of a UCD that has 
not been copied but independently developed, see 
infra) would not represent an act of infringement. In 
the case where a third party legitimately uses (not 
copying) a design protected only by UCD during the 
12-month grace period, and before the expiration 
of that period the UCD holder registers an RCD, the 
third party can continue in her activity within the 
limits of pre-use as long as she acts in good faith, she 
has not copied the design,51 and most importantly, 
her use does not constitute a disclosure. In fact, it 
must be borne in mind that this grace period is not 
a right of priority,52 nor does it have similar conse-
quences: any third-party independent (i.e. not oc-
casioned by information or actions of the designer) 
disclosure operates along the normal rules, meaning 
that it would prevent the designer who finds herself 
in the 12-month grace period from the possibility of 
successfully filing a registration for lack of novelty.53
32  An important limit contained in the CDR is that of 
Article 8, which excludes from protection those fea-
tures (not the entire design) that are dictated en-
tirely by technical considerations (as a logical cor-
ollary of what was established by Article 6 above). 
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Article 8 embraces two different cases: the first case 
of exclusion is mandated when the form of a prod-
uct is dictated by a technical function, while the sec-
ond is observable where the form is dictated by the 
need to mechanically combine or connect with other 
products. The rationale of this exclusion is explained 
in Recital 10 CDR, according to which technological 
innovation should not be hampered by granting de-
sign protection to features dictated solely by a tech-
nical function. In particular, the purpose of such pro-
visions is to prevent design rights from being used 
to obtain monopolies over technical solutions with-
out meeting the relatively more stringent conditions 
laid down in patent law.54
III. Scope of protection 
and infringement
33 Article 10 deals with the key aspect of the scope of 
protection. The scope of protection is based on the 
parameters contained in Articles 5 and 6, and states 
that the protection conferred by a community de-
sign (CD) includes any design which does not pro-
duce on the informed user a different overall im-
pression assessed in consideration of the degree of 
freedom of the designer in developing his design.  
Remarkably, the scope of protection of a CD as such 
is not affected by the products and classifications 
to which the design is applied or incorporated.55 
This means that a design protected as applied to a 
lamp could be infringed by a completely different 
product, such as a personal bag. However, it seems 
that the correct reading of the provisions of Arti-
cles 10 and 36(6) is that the fact that the design is 
incorporated in two different products should not 
per se exclude an infringement. In fact, the ultimate 
test remains that of a different overall impression 
on the informed user, who can obtain or not obtain 
such similar or different impression also in light of 
whether the design is incorporated in different and 
unrelated products.56
34  Therefore, in a hypothetical infringement test, an in-
formed user should compare the two designs as they 
are applied to the respective specific products.57 If 
the same design is applied to a fork and to a spoon, 
there is a higher likelihood that the informed user 
gets a similar overall impression. However, if the 
same spoon shape is applied to an 80-meter-long, 
2000-ton space shuttle, the informed user’s over-
all impression might be quite different. This read-
ing of the test contributes to a more balanced view 
of the protection offered by CD, and helps to justify 
the requirement to indicate the class of products for 
which protection is claimed during the registration 
phase. It also contributes to limiting possible un-
justified monopolies of forms on products not even 
identified.
35  The relevance of the product to which a design is 
applied or incorporated is confirmed by the  OHIM, 
where it establishes that a certain design can only be 
registered for some class of products and not for oth-
ers (for example, blueprints for houses can only be 
registered as “other printed subject matter”, and not 
as “building”; see above). The rule seems to follow 
logics: if the goal of CD is to protect the appearance 
of a product, protection is given, and infringement 
can take place only in the presence of those prod-
ucts’ appearance (the protected one and the infring-
ing one). The fact that the product is defined broadly 
implies that protection and infringement will occur 
more often than if the definition had been narrower, 
but the presence of a product is still necessary. The 
fact that Article 36(6) establishes that protection is 
not limited to the class of products for which reg-
istration is filed represents a – questionable – pol-
icy decision that can only be interpreted systemat-
ically as excluding the fact that a different class of 
products would automatically determine a non-in-
fringement finding. Still, as the OHIM practice rec-
ognizes, the fact that a design is applied or incorpo-
rated to different products does have consequences, 
sometimes as serious as to cause the rejection of the 
application.   
36  Another aspect that should be considered in the in-
fringement test is the type of overall impression in 
light of what we observed when analysing Article 6 
(see supra). In other words, should the infringement 
test employ the “clearly different” standard as found 
in Recital 14? This consideration has direct practi-
cal consequences, since it will determine whether 
a product (its overall impression on the informed 
user) needs to be just different, or clearly different 
from a protected one, in order to discard infringe-
ment. In the silence of the CDR, it seems to this au-
thor that should be followed the theory sustaining 
that “clearly” operates only in the case of Article 6 
(prior art test) and not in the case of Article 10 (in-
fringement test).58 The main reasons are based on 
policy considerations:
37 It is one thing to restrict the grant of a monopoly 
right to designs which are shown “clearly” to differ 
from the existing design corpus. That makes sense – 
you need clear blue water between the registered de-
sign and the “prior art”, otherwise there is a real risk 
that design monopolies will or may interfere with 
routine, ordinary, minor, every-day design modifi-
cations – what patent lawyers call “mere workshop 
modifications.” But no such policy applies to the 
scope of protection. It is sufficient to avoid infringe-
ment if the accused product is of a design which pro-
duces a “different overall impression.” There is no 
policy requirement that the difference be “clear.” If 
a design differs, that is enough – an informed user 
can discriminate.59
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38 This view, though offering a justification to the 
specific difference in the wording of Recital 14 and 
in that of Article 10, seems to be only partially ac-
cepted by commentators.60 A better drafting tech-
nique would have helped to avoid such an interpre-
tative loophole.
IV. Registered and unregistered
39 In order to benefit from the protection offered by 
CDR, it is not necessary to file an application and ob-
tain the consequent registration of the design. Regis-
tration is a requirement only for RCD, which offers a 
stronger protection to its holder (it offers protection 
also against design independently developed). How-
ever, if the designer decides not to register her de-
sign (or during the 12-month grace period), she will 
enjoy UCD protection, which offers the same extent 
of protection as the RCD, but only against acts of di-
rect copying. Albeit different in nature, the broader 
right granted by registration and the anti-copying 
right granted by UCD – once validly registered or val-
idly substantiated during a court proceeding61 – of-
fer to their proprietor the same type of rights: the 
right to use the corresponding product of design and 
to prevent any third party not having her consent 
from using it.62 The difference between CDR and UCD 
in terms of the type of protection offered resides in 
the nature of the alleged infringing design: any in-
fringing design in the case of RCD, or only infringing 
design resulting from copying of the protected de-
sign.63 In particular, the contested design shall not be 
deemed based on an act of copying if it results from 
an independent activity by a designer who may be rea-
sonably thought not to be familiar with the design made 
available to the public by the holder.64 This means that 
the CDR creates a sort of simple presumption in fa-
vour of the UCD holder, given the fact that it is the 
alleged infringer who has to prove that she is not fa-
miliar with the “original” design (which needs to be 
disclosed in the public in the first place in order to 
trigger UCD protection).65
V. Rights granted by 
community design
40 Article 19 specifies that a CD confers on its holder 
the exclusive right to use it and to prevent any third 
party from doing the same. The Article further offers 
a non-exhaustive but detailed list of what “use” shall 
mean: the making, offering, putting on the market, 
importing, exporting or using of a product in which 
the design is incorporated or to which it is applied.66 
Once more we can observe how the CDR is far from 
clear in its use of legal terms. With regard to the 
present Article, it is not clear whether an infringe-
ment is caused by an unauthorized use of the design 
or of a product to which the design is applied or in-
corporated. Article 19’s literal structure is not con-
clusive in this regard, as in the first sentence it only 
employs the word “design” (a community design shall 
confer … the right to use it, i.e. the right to use the com-
munity design), while in the second sentence’s list 
of possible acts of infringement, all the given exam-
ples make reference to the presence of a product in 
which the design is incorporated or applied.
41  It must be noted that the concept of product is cen-
tral to the entire CD structure: only if a product ex-
ists can there be a design right applying to it, and 
consequently also an infringement can only be oc-
casioned by a product incorporating the design.67 
After all, the same Article 3, defining a CD, clearly 
states that the essence of a design is the appearance of 
a product. This means that infringement can only oc-
cur where a person deals with or uses another prod-
uct with the same appearance.
42  Although reduced in importance by the broad defi-
nition of product, the determination of whether a 
product is necessary to cause infringement is not 
without relevant consequences. Bently asks whether 
a cartoon character registered as a design is used 
when the cartoon is broadcast on TV or otherwise 
communicated online. In such cases of on-air or on-
line uses, can we still speak of an industrial or hand-
icraft product? In that author’s opinion, the answer 
should be in the negative, rooting this view not only 
in the literal and systematic analysis of Article 19, 
and more in general in the whole structure of CD, 
which, as mentioned, is construed around the con-
cept of product, but also on Recital 21, which spec-
ifies that a CD right should extend to trade in prod-
ucts embodying infringing designs.68
43  The same author, however, notes that the defini-
tion of design clearly indicates that the appearance 
of graphic symbols is to be protected. In this respect, 
confining use to material products – excluding im-
material media such as the web – seems unduly lim-
iting. The effect of this narrow construction, the au-
thor explains, is also to exclude web design from the 
field of designs law.69
44  Focusing on the semantic meaning of the concept, 
it seems that the “use” of an “industrial” or “hand-
icraft” product is linked to its physical dimension, 
where it can carry out the function for which it is 
manufactured. However, in light of the current tech-
nological development that allows uses of physical 
products on immaterial medias, it does not seem pos-
sible to conclude that the CDR explicitly excludes 
such acts from the definition of use, a definition that 
is general and open ended.
45  A possible help to untangle this complex problem 
could perhaps be found by looking once again at 
the test for infringement. A community design of 
a screwdriver is infringed, for example, when other 
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identical screwdrivers are manufactured without the 
rightholder’s consent. But the use of the screwdriv-
er’s appearance on a monitor (such as when read-
ing an eBook) seems not to be tantamount to an act 
of infringement: First, one could argue that there 
is no use of the product; there is only the appear-
ance without the product (after all, there is no screw-
driver). Second, and maybe more importantly, even 
assuming that a product is present (if an eBook can 
be considered a product, after all, although a quite 
different one for this purpose), the overall impres-
sion on the informed user is different, as few would 
confuse the product screwdriver with the product 
eBook that at page xy has a 2D representation of a 
screwdriver (assuming that a normal use of an eBook 
makes its pages visible). If this difference is able to 
cause a different overall impression on an informed 
user, no infringement occurs.
VI. Computer icons and other 
computer-based designs
46 The practice of OHIM specifically allows registra-
tions for computer icons and graphic user interfaces 
(GUI) produced by computer programs, usually in 
Locarno class 14.70 In light of the OHIM manual, it 
seems that a protectable immaterial product could 
certainly be the graphical user interface of a com-
puter screen layout with the exclusion of sounds. 
Whether moving images and dynamic user inter-
faces can be held protectable is not clear. However, 
the concept of appearance of a product seems to ex-
clude that dynamic elements, many times governed 
by the final user, can be included under the scope 
of protection. Further, it would be difficult to doc-
ument such unpredictable dynamic aspects in the 
registration process.
47  It must be noted that, while protection of computer 
icons and GUI would probably be considered highly 
debatable, in the absence of a specific provision, an 
industrial or handicraft product represented in dig-
ital form is probably enough to trigger protection. 
There is a clear conceptual difference between the 
digital item “computer icon” – which is neither an 
industrial or handicraft product nor possesses the 
characteristic to be made, manufactured or printed 
into one, and that unfolds its function exclusively on 
the computer screen as a digital immaterial item – 
and a spoon represented digitally as a CAD file. A de-
sign that is computer created using a computer-as-
sisted design program (CAD) and that represents 
perfectly the appearance of the product (therefore 
in the correct number of dimensions, sizes, colours, 
indications of materials, and more generally all the 
information that is required to define its appear-
ance), can most likely be deemed protectable, and 
its actual manufacture is probably not necessary in 
order to activate the CD.
48  Once more the legal framework is not absolutely 
clear in this specific case, which is quite common to 
many modern designers, as we will see. We know, 
though, that the OHIM is not interested in such as-
pects in its determination of whether to grant a reg-
istered community design: “Whether the product in-
dicated is actually made or used, or can be made or 
used, in an industrial or handicraft manner, shall not 
be examined”.71
49 The very same process of registration does not re-
quire a specimen of the claimed CD, save for the lim-
ited case of Article 36(1)(c).72 And Article 11, defin-
ing the commencement of protection of the UCD, 
includes among the acts that constitute a communi-
cation to the public the publication of the design (in-
corporated or applied to a product). It is not clear if 
the term publication is limited to the case of 2D de-
signs such as ornaments, but it seems plausible that 
as long as the outer appearance of a product is com-
municated to the public, this is sufficient to trigger 
the legal effects of CD. It has been argued that as long 
as the appearance of the product is made available 
to the public, even an oral disclosure could achieve 
the purpose.73
50  The same Examination Guidelines seem to require – 
a contrario – that a design exists only in relation to 
an industrial or handicraft item, which has to exist 
or be passible/subject to coming into existence.
VII. Exceptions and limitations
51 Article 20 provides for certain limitations of the 
rights conferred by a CD. The rights conferred by a 
CD shall not be exercised in respect of: (i) acts done 
privately and for non-commercial purposes, (ii) acts 
done for experimental purposes, and (iii) acts of re-
production for the purpose of making citations or of 
teaching.74 Article 20 also provides for another set of 
exception (sec. 2) that are specific to the repair of 
aircrafts and ships, but these are not of interest here.
52  In the first of the listed exceptions, Article 20 spec-
ifies that it is not sufficient that an act be done for 
non-commercial purposes, but it must also be “pri-
vate”.75 Therefore, a non-commercial public use will 
fall outside the present exception. This double re-
striction (private and non-commercial) is not re-
quired by international sources, and it should be as-
certained whether under a policy perspective it is 
desirable.76 It is not required, however, that the use 
be personal; therefore, all uses that are not public – 
including a private number of individuals and those 
that are done for non-commercial purposes – will be 
deemed covered by the provision.77
53  The exception for experimental purposes is drafted 
following a similar provision in the  Topography Di-
rective.78 In particular, it seems that acts done for ex-
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perimental commercial purposes should be included 
within the scope of this exemption.79 It is unclear 
whether experiments have to be concerned with the 
design itself, or whether any type of experiment em-
ploying a protected product of design are exempted, 
therefore including those cases where the experi-
mentation is directed to something different than 
the design, but where the latter is used.80
54  The third exception should look quite familiar to 
copyright scholars. It provides that acts of repro-
duction for the purpose of making citations or of 
teaching are exempted from protection, provided 
that mention of the source is made, and that such 
acts do not unduly prejudice the normal exploita-
tion of the design. Citation is not further defined, 
and it seems that any act is allowed that reproduces 
a design as long as this is in accordance with fair 
trade practice and does not prejudice the normal 
exploitation of the design. Bently brings the exam-
ple of a book about design, where designs of shapes 
(3D) are reproduced in the book. He argues that in 
such a case, there should be no need to resort to 
such an exception in the first place (the design is 
not applied to a product). However, should it not 
be the case, the present exception will be a helpful 
demonstration.81 The teaching limitation is broadly 
defined and should not be limited to educational in-
stitutions (public or private) but extend to any act 
connected with teaching.82 This will, of course, be 
limited to acts of reproduction for teaching, and will 
clearly not extend to dealing in products involving 
such reproductions.83 A third and final condition is 
required: mention of the source. Once again, this is a 
provision with an obscure meaning – not only do we 
lack a definition of source but also of designer. Bently 
observes that it is unclear who – among the manu-
facturer, the designer and the design proprietor – 
should be taken as the source, and cautiously sug-
gests mentioning those three.84 Musker, on the other 
side, believes that the designer/author does not need 
any recognition, limiting the mention to the manu-
facturer or the supplier, at least in the case of UCD, 
since in the case of a registered design, a mention of 
the CD Bulletin number will suffice.85
VIII. Ownership
55 Entitlement to a right in community design is dealt 
by Article 14, which identifies the (not better de-
fined) designer or his successor in title as the owner 
of the right to the community design. In the next sec-
tion, the same Article recognizes the possibility of 
joint development by different designers, in which 
case this right shall vest in them jointly. Section 3 
clarifies that in the case of an employee developing 
the design in execution of his duties or following the 
instructions given by his employer, the right to CD 
shall vest in the employer, unless otherwise agreed 
or specified under national law. This last provision is 
not deemed applicable in cases of commissioned de-
signs, where in the absence of a specific agreement 
the right to CD will vest in the designer.86
56  Article 14 is silent on who qualifies as a designer. It 
has been noted how CD has been created and imple-
mented with industry and market interests in mind, 
not designers, and this pillar of CD is observable, for 
example, in the attention given to the concept of de-
sign as an industrial product, rather than in the fig-
ure of the designers as individuals undertaking pro-
ductive and innovative activities.
57  The chosen wording – a designer does not create a 
design, but develops it – suggests further that there 
is a weak link between the designer and the design, 
and a much stronger one between the product and 
its industrial or handicraft background. To deter-
mine who is the designer, especially in the case (not 
central to the entire CD framework) of individual de-
signers, is not an easy task. Musker notes that since 
“design” is the appearance of the whole or a part of 
a product (Art. 3(a)), designers are those who define 
that appearance.87 However, this consideration will 
not have a conclusive result with many instances 
of collaborative development, since “a given design 
may involve contributions at many levels, from set-
ting the specification or brief (which is probably at 
too high a level to specify the appearance of a prod-
uct sufficiently to qualify the setter as a designer in 
most cases) down to making the production draw-
ings or CAD file (which is probably at too low a level 
to do so in most cases)”.88 In some instances, where 
rights other than CD are protecting the product of a 
design (such as copyright, or trade-marks, or other 
forms of national protection), it might well happen 
that these rights follow different ownership rules, 
and consequently lead to a product that can be de-
fined as “complex” from the subjective point of view, 
or in other words, where different property rights 
are allocated to different owners: a clear case of eco-
nomic inefficiency also known as “tragedy of the 
anti-commons”.89  
C. Copyright
58 Copyright plays a key role in the protection of ap-
plied art and industrial design. It also represents a 
difficult element to analyse from an EU perspective. 
The EU legal framework in the field of design pro-
tection establishes the principle of cumulation with 
copyright, but leaves the determination of the ex-
tent and the conditions of this protection (and es-
pecially the levels of originality required) to be de-
termined by each member state.90
59  This provision, which arguably represents the at-
tempt to reconcile the many different national ap-
proaches, is unfortunate for the consequences it cre-
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ates under a common market (and society) point of 
view. It partially misses the objective to create a 
more consistent European framework for the pro-
tection of designs, since it mandates cumulation 
with a legal tool that is all but harmonized within 
the EU. The explicit provision that every Member 
State can determine the extent and the conditions 
under which copyright protection for works of in-
dustrial design is granted, pushes towards an even 
wider plethora of possible solutions, furthering di-
versity of approaches at the national level.
60  It can be observed that in different countries the level 
of originality required for products of design differs 
greatly, ranging from the standard level required for 
any other work (perfect cumulation approach91), to 
much higher levels, such as the requirement of ar-
tistic value (partial cumulation approach92). An ef-
fect of the EU legislative policy in design protection 
has certainly been to get rid of those approaches that 
did not allow cumulation or only under certain strict 
conditions (such as in the case of “separability” in 
place in Italy before the entry into force of the DD).
61  This small step forward under the light of standard-
ization cannot make up for a solution that fosters 
differences rather than similarities, and it is hard to 
understand how this can produce positive effects in 
the European market and society.
62  The InfoSoc Directive makes little to no reference to 
the issue of cumulability with design rights. A refer-
ence to them can be found in the final section of the 
Directive dealing with common provisions. Article 
9, titled “Continued application of other legal pro-
visions”, states that “this directive shall be without 
prejudice to provisions concerning in particular … 
design rights”.93 As we will see in more detail below, 
other major international copyright instruments, 
such as the Berne Convention or the TRIPs Agree-
ments, tend to leave broad directionality to Mem-
bers in terms of cumulation.94
I. EU directives: Scope of protection 
and protected rights
63 Policy criticisms aside, a brief analysis of the relevant 
aspects of EU copyright law will help to understand 
the relationship between the latter, design rights 
and CC. As mentioned, EU copyright law has wit-
nessed different attempts of harmonization; none-
theless, this plurality has not led to a unique harmo-
nized EU framework. Partly due to the limited scope 
of some of the directives,95 partly because, even 
when the directives had a more horizontal scope, 
they only harmonized “certain aspects”,96 we are still 
nowadays in the presence of an only partially har-
monized EU copyright framework.
64  The most relevant – for our purposes – of the copy-
right directives is certainly the Directive 2001/29/
EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of cop-
yright and related rights in the information soci-
ety (InfoSoc)97. The scope of the InfoSoc Directive 
is to harmonize the legal protection (some aspects 
thereof) of copyright and related rights in the frame-
work of the internal market, with particular empha-
sis on the information society.98 It harmonizes in the 
first instance the type of rights that right-holders 
should be granted in the digital environment. Mem-
ber States shall provide for the exclusive right of 
reproduction for authors and for rightholders of 
related rights,99 of communication and making avail-
able to the public by wire or wireless and “on-de-
mand” for authors and other rightholders,100 and of 
the right of distribution of works.101 Article 5 of the 
Directive provides for a list of possible exceptions 
and limitations to copyright (ELC) to the aforemen-
tioned rights. This Article encompasses a closed list 
of non-mandatory ELC (save for the case of tempo-
rary acts of reproductions102) whose harmonization 
effects – in light of such an extremely modest legis-
lative technique – have already been criticized in a 
number of publications, and with good reason.103 Suf-
fice it here to restate that if the objective is to har-
monize EU copyright law, the act of creating a closed 
list of non-mandatory ELC, whose implementation is 
left to each Member State to be decided upon, sim-
ply misses the goal of the Directive as a tool of EU 
legal harmonization.
65 That being said – and with the limits of a set of rights 
subject to 27 different possible combinations of ELC 
– the aforementioned rights do form a core of pro-
tected activities that are harmonized at the Member 
State level and that can therefore be considered re-
served to their copyright-holder across the EU ter-
ritory in a more or less consistent way.
II. Protected works and elaborations
66 Crucial to our analysis is to note how the InfoSoc Di-
rective does not define two concepts. The first is the 
fundamental concept of protected work, i.e. a defini-
tion of the protected subject matter by EU copyright 
law. The second is the concept of derivative work or 
adaptation (we will fully discover the importance 
of this concept infra). These two aspects are left un-
touched by the InfoSoc or any other EU Directive, 
and Member States are left free to offer protection to 
the subject matter (and derivatives) of their choice 
– at least from an EU perspective. It is true, in fact, 
that beyond the EU Directives – and CJEU decisions104 
– another major source for copyright harmoniza-
tion, or at least coordination, is represented by the 
international agreements concluded in the area of 
copyright and intellectual property more generally.
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67  In our field there are at least three major interna-
tional instruments that cannot be forgotten in this 
analysis: the Berne Convention (BC),105 the WIPO Cop-
yright Treaty (WCT)106 and the TRIPs agreements.107 
For our limited goal (definition of protected works 
and of derivative works), it would suffice to analyse 
the relevant provisions of the BC given the inter-
twined system created by the aforementioned three 
instruments for what concerns some basic rules.108 
The BC, in Article 2, offers a non-exhaustive but quite 
detailed list of protected works, which (selected on 
the basis of their relevance for this study) includes 
“every production in the literary, scientific and ar-
tistic domain … such as works of drawing, painting, 
architecture, sculpture, works of applied art, … plans, 
sketches, … and three dimensional works relative to 
… architecture or science”.109 Section 3 of Article 2 
indicates that “[t]ranslations, adaptations, arrange-
ments of music and other alterations of a literary 
or artistic work shall be protected as original works 
without prejudice to the copyright in the original 
work”.110 It is interesting to note that section 7 of 
the same Article establishes a specific provision for 
the case of applied art, industrial design and models, 
leaving it as a matter for legislation at the national 
level “... to determine the extent of the application 
of their laws to works of applied art and industrial 
designs and models, as well as the conditions un-
der which such works, designs and models shall be 
protected”.
68  This specific provision has played an important role 
at the EU level towards the adoption of the princi-
ple of cumulation, in order to overcome the possi-
ble discriminations of protection on the basis of the 
country of origin and reciprocity rule.111
III. Some national examples
69 Accordingly, it is possible to find at the national level 
of EU Member States the presence of provisions in 
copyright law regarding the protectability of works 
of industrial design and applied art, though signifi-
cant differences survive, especially in the pre-DD era.
1. Netherlands
70 Illustratively, the Dutch Copyright Act clarifies in Ar-
ticle 10 that “literary, scientific or artistic works in-
cludes … works of applied art and industrial designs 
and models”112 and that “reproductions of a literary, 
scientific or artistic work in a modified form, such 
as translations, arrangements of music … and other 
adaptations … shall be protected as separate works, 
without prejudice to the copyright in the original 
work”. No special requirements are present in the 
Dutch Copyright Act regarding the protection of de-
sign, nor does the Dutch design law prescribe any 
particular requisite.
71  As mentioned earlier, the Benelux (the union of 
states formed by Belgium, the Netherlands and Lux-
emburg) is governed by uniform design law provi-
sions in virtue of the Benelux Convention on Intel-
lectual Property (Trade-marks and Designs).113 Under 
the Convention, Benelux offers a good example of a 
perfect cumulation approach.114 Under the old Ben-
elux Design Law, however, the situation was differ-
ent, as that act required a “clear artistic” character 
in order for designs to be able to attract copyright 
protection.115 The Court of Justice of Benelux, how-
ever, clarified that the threshold for copyright pro-
tection for works of applied art should be reached 
when the work has an original character showing 
the author’s personality, not much differently from 
any other copyrightable subject matter, and accord-
ingly Article 21 of the old design act, requiring this 
extra condition, was repealed.116
2. Italy
72 The Italian Copyright Act117 protects works of inge-
nuity possessing creative character in the field of lit-
erature, figurative arts and architecture regardless 
of the form of expression. In particular, the protec-
tion includes “works of industrial design that pres-
ent by themselves creative character and artistic 
value”.118 It is therefore not easy to reach copyright 
protection for designs in Italy. Designs need to pos-
sess not only creative character but also the new 
and arguably difficult-to-reach parameter of artis-
tic value. Artistic value can be reached when “wide 
acknowledgement is expressed by different cultural 
institutions, in favour of the belonging of the work to 
an ambit of expression which is rooted and expresses 
tendencies and influences of artistic movements, be-
yond the intentions and the very same awareness of 
its author, as the work of artistic content acquires 
value in itself thanks to its expressive and commu-
nicative characteristics”.119
73  This high requirement creates a system where very 
few designs and works of applied art are able to en-
joy copyright protection. It also seems quite clear 
that, even if it is not possible to speak of separabil-
ity (scindibilità) anymore, a requisite as high as “ar-
tistic value” is as close to the pre-Design Directive 
standard as legitimately possible after the entry into 
force of said Directive.
74  Italian-based designers should also consider the sep-
arate issue of the repeatedly reformed transitory 
provision contained in Article 239 of the Industrial 
Property Code, which in its current wording grants a 
13-year period of time during which products of de-
sign that were in the public domain before 19 April 
2001 (the date that sanctioned the cumulation of 
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protections in the Italian system) can still be pro-
duced without infringing the relative copyright by 
those third parties who by that date were already – 
legitimately because in the public domain – produc-
ing such items, but only within the limits (includ-
ing quantitative limits) of the pre-use. Said period 
of time (13 years) has been introduced very recently 
by a law of 2012120 amending the previous period of 
time of five years. The five-year period was in place 
between the reported reform of the law of 2012 and 
2010.121 Before 2010 the  transitory provision was of 
10 years.122 Note that the 10-year period was the ob-
ject of the preliminary ruling of the ECJ, which de-
clared it in contrast to EU law.123 How a reform that 
brings the period of 10 years (judged excessive by the 
Court) to 13 years can be held legitimate remains ob-
scure. Courts in Italy have already taken the stand 
that this 13-year period is clearly in contradiction to 
EU law and therefore should not be applied.124
3. UK
75 In the UK, copyright law125 confers protection to de-
signs by protecting the form and decoration of ar-
ticles as artistic works (sculptures, engravings, or 
works of artistic craftsmanship126). Copyright pro-
vides protection also to preliminary documents on 
which a design has been based, usually as a graphic 
work.127
76  Of special interest in the UK legal landscape are the 
specific rules that apply to the interface between 
copyright and design rights. In particular, section 51 
of the CDPA states that copyright is not infringed by 
making an article from a design document or a model 
which records or embodies a design where the de-
sign is for anything other than an artistic work or a 
typeface.128 This is a fundamental aspect for our anal-
ysis: “copyright in a blueprint for a three-dimen-
sional industrial design will not be infringed where 
a person makes articles that embody the drawing”.129 
Note that for section 51, design means the design of 
any aspect of the shape or configuration (whether 
internal or external) of the whole or part of an ar-
ticle, other than surface decoration. This includes 
non-visible parts (which are excluded from CD), but 
excludes surface decorations (which are included in 
CD). Also, the existence of an unregistered form of 
protection peculiar to the UK legal system has to be 
accounted for: making an article from a 3D blueprint 
may represent an infringement of unregistered de-
sign rights.130
77  Section 51 operates only in the case of a design doc-
ument, which must be for something other than an 
artistic work, and applies only to the creation of a 3D 
article copied from the design document. Section 51 
will not apply in the case of decorations or other 2D 
designs. Section 4(1) CDPA defines artistic work as 
“a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, 
irrespective of artistic quality, a work of architec-
ture being a building or a model for a building, or a 
work of artistic craftsmanship”. Given such a broad 
meaning of artistic work, the real extent of section 
51’s relevance is probably quite limited.131
78  The CDPA is also interesting as in section 52 it con-
tains a limitation of the term of protection for cop-
yright: when an artistic work has been exploited 
by an industrial process by making more than 50 
articles, all of which are copies, copyright will last 
only 25 years from when the article was first mar-
keted (counting from the end of the calendar year).132 
However, articles such as works of sculpture, printed 
matter, maps, plans and the like are explicitly ex-
cluded from the exception.133 Section 52 operates as 
a defence, and only with regards to acts that apply 
the design to a product. The mere reproduction of 
the copyright disconnected from any design does 
not benefit from the defence (meaning that copy-
right will regain its natural term). The future sur-
vival of section 52 is uncertain as proposals for its 
repeal have been discussed.134
IV. Final observations to part I
79 As a conclusion to the part dedicated to designs pro-
tection, we can observe that in the EU products of 
design can be protected by a quite conspicuous and 
overlapping number of rights. Even limiting our 
analysis to only two of them (the most relevant an-
yway: design rights and copyright), the possible dif-
ferent rules that apply in function of the relevant 
jurisdiction are many. For example, a product of de-
sign, protected by a registered community design, is 
likely protected also by copyright, unless the appli-
cable law has provisions similar to the Italian one, 
in which case it should be ascertained whether the 
product is not only creative but also possesses an 
artistic value, or any other threshold that domestic 
law has established.
80  As a matter of fact, the same product can be pro-
tected by copyright in one country (Germany) and 
not in another one (Italy) as some case law has 
demonstrated.135 This possesses a clear negative im-
pact on the free circulation of goods in the internal 
market.
81  However, the failure to implement a consistent cu-
mulation scheme in the internal market is only one, 
although quite serious, reason for criticisms. From 
what we have seen thus far, design law, though hav-
ing achieved some remarkable harmonizing effects, 
has nonetheless failed to regulate the field of de-
sign rights in a consistent and technologically neu-
tral way. In particular it lacks the flexibility to offer 
a suitable form of protection to modern, small-sized, 
3D printing, EU-based, open designers. Aspects such 
as the lack of prior art search during registration 
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and the consequent bad quality titles that this pro-
duces, the threshold of “difference” in prior art and 
infringement tests, the fact that registration re-
quires the indication of the class of products with-
out limiting the scope of protection, the absence of 
a clear definition of designer, the extremely limited 
ambit of operation of exceptions and limitations, and 
the confusing terminology employed when it comes 
to identifying an industrial or handicraft item and 
when it is used, are but the major identified flaws. 
Their reform would contribute to bringing the entire 
EU design law framework closer not just to the needs 
of Open Designers, but more generally to the needs 
of a more efficient EU legal and economic system.
82  Copyright, on the other side, while suffering from 
some of the same flaws, seems a more flexible tool. 
However, it is poorly harmonized throughout Eu-
rope, a situation exacerbated in the specific case of 
works of industrial design and applied art by the fact 
that it is left to Member States to establish the lev-
els of originality for protection. In the next section 
we will see whether contracts (a peculiar typology 
thereof) can be successfully employed to overcome 
such shortcomings.
D. Creative Commons
83 Creative Commons (CC) is a non-profit organization 
that endorses a modern view of copyright – the fa-
mous some rights reserved principle – and offers li-
censes and other legal tools for free public use. There 
are different licenses that CC offers, but the most 
relevant in terms of use is the CC Public License 
(CCPL), which comes with different license elements 
(clauses) depending on the selection that users can 
make on the online license chooser.136 Another in-
teresting license is CC0 (CC zero), which comes in 
just one “flavour” and is better seen as a waiver of 
different rights that the affirmer has on the work 
or other material. There is a fair amount of avail-
able information, mostly online, on CC operations 
and the licenses.137 Here we will specifically focus on 
a few features that are relevant in cases of products 
of design and applied art.138 We will make reference 
to the CCPL in its current version 3 (CCPLv3). In the 
second half of 2012, a deep revision of CCPLv3 was 
initiated with the objective to develop a new ver-
sion 4 (CCPLv4) by 2013. When this paper was writ-
ten, CCPLv4 had not yet reached final public release; 
nonetheless, we will make specific reference to the 
changes in the new version that could have an im-
pact on the aspects hereby studied.139
I. The Creative Commons 
Public License (CCPL)
84 The CCPL offers a core of rights that are always li-
censed regardless of the options that licensors 
choose. These rights include the right to reproduce, 
redistribute, communicate to the public, make avail-
able to the public and perform the work. Licensors 
can further choose among the following optional 
conditions:
BY – Attribution: Attribution must be given to the li-
censor in the modalities indicated in the license. At-
tribution is not actually an option anymore since it 
applies per default since version 2.0.
NC – Non Commercial: Licensor offers the rights 
identified above only for purposes that are not pri-
marily intended for or directed towards commer-
cial advantage or private monetary compensation.140
ND – Non Derivatives: Licensor reserves the right to 
create derivative works.
SA – Share Alike: Licensor allows the creation of de-
rivative works only under the condition that those 
are licensed under the same – or an equivalent 
– license.
85 The main question that this paper attempts to an-
swer is whether a CCPL can be applied to design 
products and if yes, whether this can represent the 
basis to develop a legal theoretical framework fit 
for an Open Design model. In order to answer this 
question, we need to analyse CCPL’s scope and li-
censed rights.
II. CCPL’s scope and licensed rights
86 The license grant is contained in section 3 of the 
CCPL141 and provides that by using such license a li-
censor grants a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclu-
sive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable 
copyright) license to exercise the rights in the Work 
as stated below:
• to Reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work 
into one or more Collections, and to Reproduce 
the Work as incorporated in the Collections;
• to create and Reproduce Adaptations provided 
that any such Adaptation, including any trans-
lation in any medium, takes reasonable steps to 
clearly label, demarcate or otherwise identify 
that changes were made to the original Work. 
For example, a translation could be marked “The 
original work was translated from English to 
Spanish,” or a modification could indicate “The 
original work has been modified.”;
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• to Distribute and Publicly Perform the Work in-
cluding as incorporated in Collections; and,
• to Distribute and Publicly Perform Adaptations
87 In the 4th draft of version 4 (CCPL 4.0d4), the struc-
ture of the licenses has received major restructur-
ing, and content-wise the license grant has been ex-
panded substantially. Not only neighbouring rights, 
such as the database sui generis right, are explicitly in-
cluded in the scope of the license, but the reserva-
tion clause typical of CCPL3.0 has been removed.142 
As we will see, however, the now open-ended list of 
rights included in the scope of the license is not still 
capable, nor is it arguably intended, to capture de-
sign rights.
88  In the new version 4.0 there is a new definition in 
section 1.l, that of “Share”, which includes most of 
the activities listed in section 3 of the previous ver-
sion.143 The grant is contained now in section 2 and 
reads along the lines of the previous version 3 defi-
nition, save for employing the term share as defined 
in section 1.
89 In the CCPL version 3, “Work” is defined by section 
1 as:
the literary and/or artistic work … including without lim-
itation any production in the literary, scientific and artis-
tic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expres-
sion including digital form … such as … a work of drawing, 
painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving or lithography; 
…a work of applied art; an illustration, map, plan, sketch or 
three-dimensional work relative to geography, topography, 
architecture or science.
90 Version 4.0d4 has substituted the definition of work 
with that of “licensed material”, which is defined as 
“the artistic or literary work, database, or other ma-
terial to which the Licensor has applied this Public 
License”. Copyright and neighbouring rights, on the 
other hand, are defined as “copyright and/or similar 
rights closely related to copyright including, with-
out limitation, performance, broadcast, sound re-
cording, and Sui Generis Database Rights, without re-
gard to how the rights are labelled or categorized.…”
91  Note the similarity in the terminology between 
version 3 and the BC terminology, and the fact that 
works of applied art are expressly included in the 
definition of “work”. Version 4.0d4 is much more 
succinct in its definition of licensed material and 
copyright, though it employs a formula which 
clearly comprehends any subject matter included 
in the protection offered by copyright. It seems un-
questionable that both version 3 and the forthcom-
ing version 4 cover in their scope works of applied 
art and design, as long as these are protected by 
copyright.
92  At the same time, however, it seems irrefutable from 
the license grant that the CCPL (both version 3 and 
4) is a copyright license that additionally includes 
other rights closely related to copyright, but not 
rights that are different in nature, scope and struc-
ture. Design rights, as defined by the DD and CDR, 
are not only absent from the license’s enumeration, 
but their nature, scope and structure make them a 
completely different type of rights from copyright 
and from copyright-related rights – as confirmed, 
inter alia, by the fact that no sign of them is present 
in the Rome Convention nor in any EU copyright 
(and related rights) Directives.144 Design rights, un-
der a number of aspects (registration, subject mat-
ter, requirements, duration, competent offices, tests) 
are much closer to trademarks and patents, a set of 
rights that are unanimously outside the scope of the 
CCPL.145
93  Accordingly, a CCPL applied to a design will only gov-
ern the copyright in the work, and not the design 
rights in the product. This may lead to the paradoxi-
cal consequence that a user of a CCPL work of applied 
art which is also protected by design rights is allowed 
to perform some given acts on the basis of the cop-
yright regime, but prohibited to perform very simi-
lar activities on the basis of the – non-licensed – de-
sign rights.146 We will analyse in detail the possible 
situation emerging from this duality of protection 
in section 5.
III. CC0
94 Another CC license that deserves a brief mention is 
the CC0, a waiver more than a license, particularly 
popular in the field of data and databases. CC0 is in-
teresting in our analysis for two main reasons: a) its 
scope; and b) how it deals with the rights included 
in its scope.
95  Regarding the first point, we can observe that CC0’s 
scope is much broader than that of the CCPL. It in-
cludes the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, per-
form, display, communicate and translate a Work; 
publicity and privacy rights; rights protecting against 
unfair competition with regard to a work; rights pro-
tecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse 
of data in a Work; database rights; and other simi-
lar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout 
the world based on applicable law or treaty. In par-
ticular, the specific indication of privacy rights and 
unfair competition rights, and the general clause in-
cluding equivalent or corresponding rights through-
out the world, might trigger a doubt as to whether 
there is space for inclusion of design rights in such 
a broad and open-ended scope of protection.
96  The answer will most likely be in the negative for the 
case of registered design rights (as the specific ex-
clusion of patents and trademarks may suggest147), 
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but a positive answer might be plausible in the case 
of UCD or other national unregistered design forms 
of protections, given the nature of such unregistered 
rights, which can be found close to copyright un-
der more than one aspect (absence of registration, 
scope, nature of protection and infringement). Un-
registered community design also recalls some pro-
visions of unfair competition (a defence against acts 
of deliberate and slavish copying), which is specifi-
cally listed in the CC0 scope.
97  The second aspect of interest is the waiver: To the 
greatest extent permitted by, but not in contraven-
tion of, applicable law, the affirmer fully and per-
manently waives, abandons and surrenders all of its 
copyright and related rights and associated claims 
and causes of action, whether now known or not. 
Therefore, although this seems to be a case of very 
limited practical relevance, it could be possible to 
apply a CC0 to a product of design, and by this act 
the designer would surrender any copyright in it, as 
well as any UCD-based claim against acts of copying 
of the design. Of course, the designer would still be 
entitled to file a registration for an RCD within a pe-
riod of 12 months from the date of the first disclo-
sure of the product, but after this grace period, an-
ybody should feel free to reproduce the design.148 
In light of the fact that a CC0 by itself would proba-
bly not solve issues connected with the relinquish-
ment of the right to file for a registered community 
design, coupled with the fact that the applicability 
to unregistered design rights is based more on in-
terpretation than on actual wording or known case 
law, this solution remains highly hypothetical and 
should not attract the attention of those interested 
in anything more than purely academic speculation. 
If it did – and we repeat that it shouldn’t – it must 
be borne in mind that CC0 is a waiver; therefore, it 
would not be possible to employ CCPL license ele-
ments (BY, ND, NC, SA).
E. Open Design
98 In the dynamics of what we call an Open Design 
workflow,149 we have observed that a common prac-
tice among “open designers” is that of sharing their 
blueprints online in order to allow everybody to ben-
efit from their creations.150 Designers who do that 
are inspired by different sentiments, though. For 
some, the sharing of the knowledge is the major re-
ward and incentive, and accordingly those design-
ers tend to employ licenses with few restrictions, 
among which are usually “copyleft” clauses.151 Oth-
ers contrast such a libertarian stand with a much 
more pragmatic one. In their intentions the shar-
ing should contribute to spread their work and 
their name in ways (or at costs) that common mar-
keting tools could not reach, and accordingly they 
release their blueprints under terms that restrict 
the creation of derivative works or the commercial 
exploitation.
99  In light of this observation, our analysis requires a 
slight shift in angle: given the centrality of the blue-
print, it is precisely from this element that we should 
start. Blueprints, when reaching the required level 
of originality or creativity, can be considered a work 
of authorship in their own right. Alternatively, when 
purely technical and lacking any originality, it is ar-
guable that blueprints are not protected by copy-
right, though in some countries we have found a 
specific neighbouring right on the reproduction of 
the plan and on the realization of a project of engi-
neering in absence of the project drafter’s consent.152 
Blueprints, however, when disclosing the outer ap-
pearance of the product, could also be considered 
part of the product, or even as the product of design 
themselves, and accordingly attract the protection 
offered by design law (see above section 2.6).
100  Given the plurality of roles played by a blueprint, 
it can help to resort to a simple example. Let us im-
agine that a designer creates a blueprint and makes 
it available online under a CC license that allows de-
rivative works under a Share Alike (SA) provision 
(therefore employing a CCPL BY-SA). For the sake of 
clarity, we will analyse separately what can be done 
with the blueprint as a work of authorship and what 
can be done with the resulting product.
I. The blueprint
101 The first aspect at issue (the blueprint and the pos-
sibility to modify it) represents an easier case which 
follows usual copyright rules, if any. The blueprint 
can be of a purely technical nature and lack any pos-
sible form of copyright protection. This is an unlikely 
scenario considering how low the required level of 
originality usually is; however, especially in the most 
technical environments, this remains a possibility 
that cannot be excluded a priori. A technical draw-
ing reporting the calculation of the acceleration of 
a particle released from a given height and lacking 
any original or creative addition, can indeed be con-
sidered too technical for copyright protection, at 
least in those jurisdictions with higher standards.153
102  In such a case, the blueprint is not protected by cop-
yright or usually by any other neighbouring right.154 
The blueprint is said to be in the public domain, a le-
gal status that allows everybody, for copyright pur-
poses, to use and reuse the material. The applica-
tion of a CC license to this public domain blueprint 
should be harmless (and pointless), since CC licenses 
base their operation on the copyright protecting the 
work. In the absence of any copyright, no term of the 
CC license should be considered enforceable.155
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103  In the opposite case, where the blueprint meets cop-
yright standards, the license is triggered and the cre-
ation of any other work covered by its scope should 
conform to the conditions established in the license. 
Therefore, if a licensee decides to modify the blue-
print in an original way, for example adding a new 
creative element to it, this will be possible, in our 
case (use of a CCPL BY-SA), under the condition that 
the licensee correctly report the attribution, and ap-
plies the same, or an equivalent, license to the re-
sulting blueprint.156
104  But what about the possibility to manufacture a 
product based on the blueprint?
II. The product
105 A more complex analysis regards this second issue, 
i.e. the manufacture of a product from the blueprint. 
Let us imagine that a second designer finds the same 
blueprint online. She downloads the blueprint’s file 
and sends it to her 3D printer in order to obtain the 
corresponding object. At this point we need to de-
termine what is the legal status of the object under: 
a) copyright, and b) design rights.
1. Copyright
106 A first case is given by the possibility of identity be-
tween the copyrighted blueprint and the realized 
product. This means that the blueprint is not only 
the authors’ own intellectual creation but is also 
complete and final: it determines the appearance of 
the product, to use design law wording.  In this case 
the blueprint leaves no discretion to the manufac-
turer as to how to manufacture the product, and the 
manufacturer, on his side, adheres completely with 
no creative changes to the blueprint. In such a case, 
the digital blueprint (for example the CAD file157) is 
“ready”, in the sense that in order to print the prod-
uct it will be sufficient to “send” the file to the 3D 
printer. Any intermediate act before printing takes 
place is limited to predetermined and technical in-
terventions, such as “clean-up” of the CAD file from 
programming errors, the conversion of the CAD file 
in an executable code to be sent to the printer, and 
the specific regulations and parameters of the print-
ing machinery.158
107  Accordingly, the realization of the product (the 3D 
item) will very likely represent a reproduction of the 
blueprint to a different media or format not much 
different from what the printing of a digital journal 
article on a regular 2D printer would be. Also in this 
latter case, sometimes it is necessary to clean up the 
file from comments or typos, to convert the file into 
a format readable by the printer (usually done au-
tomatically by the software in a way that the user is 
completely unaware of), or configure some parame-
ter of the printer, such as the type of paper, the order 
of collation, whether comments should be printed 
and the like. All these activities have a direct influ-
ence on the final print-out; however, they are mar-
ginal and not creative and will not be deemed suffi-
cient to constitute a derivative work under copyright 
law. In a case of identity between the digital blue-
print and the material product, where the blueprint 
embraces all the creative elements of the material 
product itself, the act of printing the article is cov-
ered by the right of reproduction, not by the right 
of creation of a derivative work.159 Accordingly, the 
author of the copyrighted item is the author of the 
copyrighted blueprint, as there is only one copyright 
at stake here, one that is likely infringed – save for 
the presence of exceptions or authorizations – by 
the act of printing160.
108  In our example (CCPL BY-SA blueprint), the license 
allows printing (reproducing) as many products as 
desired, copying them further, distributing them, 
showing them in public or communicating them to 
the public, with the only limitation to apply the same 
license in case of acts of redistribution of verbatim 
or derivative works and to mention the original au-
thor in the form she indicated. As long as the print-
ing corresponds to an act of reproduction, blueprints 
distributed under a CCPL with the Non Derivative 
clause can also be legitimately printed.161 It should 
also be borne in mind that any possible ELC as pres-
ent in the applicable copyright law is explicitly af-
firmed by the license.162
109  A second different case is given when the printed 
item results in a substantially different work from 
the blueprint, either because the blueprint is not 
detailed enough to be printed right away (imagine 
that it consists of a drawing or image, maybe just in 
2D, rather than in the complete final CAD file163), or 
because the second designer decides to modify, en-
hance or in any way creatively adapt the blueprint, 
or in any other case in which the final printed item 
is substantially different from the blueprint. Under 
these circumstances (that can be analogized to the 
realization of a cinematographic adaptation from a 
novel), it must be established whether the intellec-
tual creation as present in the original blueprint is 
identifiable in the final product in a way that may 
constitute a copyright infringement, or whether, on 
the contrary, we are in the presence of a product 
merely inspired by the blueprint but that does not 
reproduce the original creation in a way prohibited 
by copyright law.
110  In the former situation, the manufacturer (who 
creatively modifies the blueprint) will be the cop-
yright holder of the derivative work (if her modifi-
cations amount to the level of originality required). 
Of course, this is without prejudice to the copyright 
in the original work. In our example, the  creation 
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of a derivative work (the modified printed product) 
does not amount to an infringement, as it is allowed 
by the Share-Alike clause of the Creative Commons 
license under which the blueprint is distributed. 
Therefore, the second creative designer will be the 
author of the copyrighted item, but obliged to ap-
ply to its work the same – or an equivalent – license 
in order to comply with the requirements of the CC-
BY-SA governing the use of the original work. Failing 
to do so (or in all cases where the original blueprint 
does not allow the creation of derivative works, such 
as the use of a CC with the Non Derivative clause) 
would trigger liability for copyright infringement, 
save for the eventual operation of any ELC.
111  In a different situation, where the product is merely 
inspired but not copied from the blueprint, it is argu-
able that the product does not infringe the copyright 
in the blueprint, in the same way that a story-line re-
garding a doctor who creates a monster named after 
him does not infringe Mary Shelley’s novel, as long 
as the former represents an independent intellectual 
creation of the author. In order to find precise appli-
cation in a real case, however, the reported general 
principle needs to face the idiosyncrasies of the le-
gal system where protection is sought, since, as re-
ported above, the concept of derivative work has re-
ceived very little attention at the EU as well as at the 
international level. Accordingly, the degree of crea-
tive autonomy that the new work needs to possess in 
order to qualify as independent and non-infringing 
can vary substantially. In order to find an answer to 
this issue, an analysis of the outer limits of the con-
cept of derivative work should be undertaken for 
any relevant country, and with particular attention 
to the transition from two to three dimensions and 
the technical or creative elaborations this implies.
2. Design rights
112 Once the designer makes the blueprint publicly 
available online, as happens in our example, she 
most likely discloses it. This will happen when the 
blueprint reveals the outer appearance of the prod-
uct, such as where there is an identification between 
the blueprint and the product of design. Accordingly, 
novelty (if present at all) becomes an impediment for 
any third party trying to claim design right protec-
tion for products that do not cause a (clearly) differ-
ent impression.164
113  This mechanism will represent an interesting op-
tion for those designers interested in sharing but 
who want to make sure that no one else can use 
their blueprints to obtain design protection. In those 
cases, designers need to consider that such a disclo-
sure operates only if it reaches the normal circles of 
business in the relevant sector. The online publica-
tion (regardless of the type of license) seems to facil-
itate this possibility, though attention should be paid 
to the specific circumstances of the case. The manu-
facture and exhibit of at least a few samples is advis-
able, in order to silence the possible objection (not 
shared here) that the design is disclosed only when 
applied or incorporated to the material product.165
114  On the contrary, when the blueprint does not cor-
respond to the appearance of a product of design, 
the act of making available the copyrighted blue-
print does not correspond to the design law con-
cepts of disclosure. A second designer could find in-
spiration from this publicly available documentation 
and manufacture an independent design with the 
intention to obtain registered or unregistered pro-
tection. This is a possible scenario that does not de-
pend on the type of license under which the blue-
print is distributed. It must be noted, however, that 
in such a case the difference between the blueprint 
(or any other design, documentation or information 
available) and the final design needs to be considera-
ble, since the latter will have to be (clearly) different 
from the already available body of designs in order 
to pass novelty and individual character tests. Un-
fortunately, however, such tests will only come into 
play during eventual litigations, and not during the 
registration process, a mechanism that has already 
been criticized in this paper.166  
115  Another aspect to keep in consideration in such cases 
is that no parts of a copyrighted blueprint (or any 
other protected work) can be present in the claimed 
design in forms that would constitute a copyright in-
fringement: Article 25 CDR lists among the reasons 
for invalidity of a CD the fact that the design consti-
tutes an unauthorized use of a work protected un-
der copyright law.167
116  An interesting case is given by the eventuality in 
which the work of art applied to the product is li-
censed under a CCPL with a non-commercial clause. 
In this case, no commercial activity that involves the 
work under CCPL can be legitimately carried out; 
therefore, most likely the entire product will have 
to be dealt with in a non-commercial way.
117  As we have seen, however, the CCPL scope does not 
cover design rights. Therefore, while the inner struc-
ture of design law, and chiefly the effects of disclo-
sure, can represent a satisfactory scheme for licen-
sors, licensees will still find themselves in a situation 
of uncertainty since they might be infringing the un-
licensed design rights.
3. The licensee’s perspective
118 So far we have focused our analysis on the licen-
sor in order to secure that she can rely on the ex-
pected legal effects that the application of a CCPL to 
the product of design should entail. Given the likely 
double layer of protection of products of design in 
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the EU and the application of a CCPL to the work of 
applied art, it seems that the licensor can reasona-
bly achieve the prospected goals, at least on the ba-
sis of the copyright provisions. In fact, the use of a 
CCPL has no consequences on the rights stemming 
from community design protection. Therefore, our 
licensor will always have in her hands the power to 
enforce her rights on the product of design even in 
contradiction with her own determinations when li-
censing the copyright in the same product (with the 
obvious limitations regarding acts contra factum pro-
prium). This can indeed be seen as irrational behav-
iour on the part of the licensor, but it is still tech-
nically possible. Further, licensors can change over 
time, transfer rights, change ideas, or simply be or 
become different persons depending on the rights 
at stake.168
119  Accordingly, the last issue that needs to be addressed 
for a complete analysis concerns the conditions un-
der which the licensee can reasonably trust that the 
acts undertaken on the basis of the CCPL will not in-
fringe the licensor’s design rights. In fact, in all those 
circumstances where the blueprint of a product of 
design discloses the appearance of the product and 
triggers protection, it can well happen that the blue-
print’s author is entitled to file registration for CDR 
or enjoy UCD anyway. As repeatedly pointed out in 
this study, we are not concerned with legal or pro-
cedural defences that may offer a resort against an 
act first permitted and then prohibited on the ba-
sis of a different right by the same person (acts con-
tra factum proprium, and relative national epiphanies 
such as bona fide doctrines, estoppel, and other legal 
presumptions). Such defences and theories can actu-
ally prove extremely effective in preventing abuses; 
however, they will vary on a case-by-case basis, and 
here we are concerned in developing a consistent 
framework based on substantive law provisions.
120  Upon disclosure of the product of design, the de-
signer enjoys the protection granted by UCD for a pe-
riod of three years, together with a 12-month grace 
period to register the design. In these cases, poten-
tial licensees could feel extremely frustrated by the 
lack of legal certainty around their use of the prod-
uct. Their use, in fact, is based on the CCPL and will 
only grant them the possibility to perform a num-
ber of acts on the basis of a copyright authoriza-
tion, with the design rights still reserved to the de-
signer. This would represent a major bias, especially 
for users beyond the amateur circle, such as in pro-
fessional and commercial environments, where the 
eventual exceptions of private and non-commercial 
uses seen above would not find application.
III. A proposal
121 In order to overcome the situation of legal uncer-
tainty caused by the use of a CCPL for products of de-
sign – that is to say, of an agreement that licenses the 
copyright but not design rights in a way that could 
lead many licensees in error – we propose to com-
bine the CCPL with other CC tools.
122  As briefly mentioned, in addition to the CCPL, Crea-
tive Commons offers additional legal tools that can 
prove quite effective in cases such as the present. 
CC+ (CCPlus) is one of those. Strictly speaking, CC+ is 
not a license but a “protocol” composed by a stand-
ard CCPL license plus an additional agreement that 
allows licensors to offer additional permissions and 
more rights above and beyond those granted by the 
standard CCPL.169
123  In our proposal, the “+” would be represented by 
a waiver whereby the affirmer relinquishes every 
possible right or interest stemming from EU com-
munity design, or from national design rights law. 
The specific wording should mirror, mutatis mutan-
dis, the one found in the CC0, with the substitutions 
and adaptations of the case. The affirmer, in particu-
lar, should declare not to have filed any application 
for a CDR, and to relinquish the relative right (which 
would exist for a 12-month period from disclosure) 
to file for a registration. In a case in which a CDR 
has been filed and/or obtained, the wavier should 
contain specific wording declaring that the rights 
granted by the CDR are waived, abandoned or re-
linquished and will never be enforced. The affirmer 
should also explicitly abandon, waive and promise 
not to assert the UCD which will endure for a period 
of three years from disclosure regardless of any af-
firmative step taken by the designer. A specific ref-
erence in the waiver should be addressed to national 
unregistered design rights (such as in the UK case).
124  In order to ensure the maximum level of compli-
ance with national laws, where and to the extent that 
such waivers are deemed invalid, the affirmer should 
grant a worldwide, non-exclusive license allowing 
the performance of all the acts that the waiver would 
have covered. The waiver should be preceded by a 
preamble clarifying the intentions and motives of 
the licensor in order to guide courts called upon to 
interpret this novel contractual structure in case 
of litigation. Again, the specific wording of the CC0 
would represent a perfect blueprint.
125  With the combination of a standard CCPL and the 
type of waiver proposed, designers will finally have 
at their disposal an easy and practical way to share 
their works with the community under the condi-
tions that so far have proven to be the most popu-
lar in Internet and digital based initiatives: attribu-
tion of paternity (in a way that community design 
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rights are not able to offer), permission/prohibition 
of creation of derivative works and eventual share 
alike, and the possibility to reserve the rights of com-
mercial exploitation, an aspect particularly popular 
among those interested in experimenting with new 
business models.
126 However, this solution has a potential flaw. Or bet-
ter, its application in jurisdictions featuring a par-
tial cumulation approach could lead to unexpected 
results. Partial cumulation jurisdictions, as seen, es-
tablish different, usually higher, levels of originality 
for works of applied art and industrial design. Where 
this level is particularly high, e.g. in Italy where an 
artistic value is required, works of applied art and 
industrial design do not usually reach that thresh-
old, and are thus only protected by design rights, not 
by copyright. This legislative solution makes perfect 
logical sense. It excludes cumulation in the major-
ity of cases (and de facto circumvents the prohibi-
tion of “scindibilitá”), offering design rights protec-
tion to products, copyright protection to works, and 
both only in those exceptional cases when a prod-
uct is also a work of art. However, in the EU only 
a minority of countries follow this solution, which 
leads to cross-border issues and consequent legal 
uncertainty.
127 The solution we just proposed, i.e. to waive design 
rights and rely on copyright, cannot obviously work 
when copyright does not exist. If applied, it would 
lead to some sort of “contractual public domain” 
status, as copyright is absent and design rights have 
been relinquished.
128 To solve the problem, an alternative approach is 
possible. It largely resembles the CC+Design solu-
tion seen above, but the “+”is in this case is not rep-
resented by a waiver, but by an additional grant that 
extends the scope of the license to include (regis-
tered and unregistered) design rights. In this way, 
design rights will not be waived, but licensed to-
gether with copyright and other related rights, and 
will therefore follow the conditions established by 
the CCPL. This solution allows licensors also in coun-
tries with a partial cumulation approach to allow 
the use and reuse of their designs under conditions 
such as attribution of paternity, use of the same or 
equivalent license for derivatives, and non-commer-
cial uses.
F. Conclusions and future work
129 Throughout an analysis of the most relevant legal 
tools that affect the activities of designers dealing 
with new personal, digital, often open-source, 3D 
printing technologies, we tried to demonstrate a 
rather simple point. Design law, at least in the EU, 
does not offer a suitable system of protection and ex-
ploitation of rights to individual designers and small-
sized enterprises that use 3D printing technologies 
in novel ways, creating innovation and added value 
in technological, economic and social terms.
130  We proposed two possible solutions that similarly 
combine a contractual tool based on copyright, cop-
yright law itself and design rights. It is undeniable 
that the proposed solutions exploit copyright law’s 
ability to control derivative works and try to annul 
as much as possible design law. In fact, in the CC+De-
sign model, design rights will have to be waived to 
the greatest extent possible, or, if not possible, in-
cluded in the scope of the license. Another solution 
would certainly be to employ licenses that specifi-
cally include design rights in their scope of protec-
tion. We think we have demonstrated that as long as 
our model proves effective in practice, such licenses 
will add very little. At the same time, they would suf-
fer from the problems connected with possible reg-
istered IP rights, i.e. a process of registration and 
the correlated costs. More importantly, CC licenses 
have the unique capacity of being modular, i.e. to 
offer a set of license elements (BY, SA, ND, NC) that 
can be chosen by the licensor, an aspect particularly 
important to designers and not found in other open 
licenses.
131 As seen, designers based in partial cumulation le-
gal systems – especially where the required level of 
originality is particularly high – should opt for the 
CC+Design expanding the scope of the license, not on 
the waiver, unless they purse a public domain-like 
result. A possible obstacle could be present in the 
UK, where the creation of an article from a design 
plan enjoys a specific copyright defence. In such a 
case, the application of a CCPL to the relative blue-
print will not be very effective, as a potential licen-
see could have a defence for not applying a specific 
license element (e.g. SA condition) to the resulting 
article. However, as seen, this scenario will only op-
erate for quite limited number of subject matter.
132  Our preference for a waiver of design rights is based 
in our critical view of the current EU design law 
framework, which we already summarized in the 
final remarks to part I. It is however important to 
restate once more at least one aspect that could be, 
and to some extent has been already, fixed by courts. 
Registered community design rights offer protection 
against any type of infringing products, including in-
dependently developed ones. In this regard, it is ex-
tremely important that the tests for protection and 
for infringement operate on a different basis: Only 
products that cause a clearly different overall impres-
sion can be considered novel, but it is sufficient for a 
product to be just different from a protected one to 
avoid infringement. If courts were to interpret the 
two tests along these lines (set forth by the UK Court 
of Appeal), by way of interpretation one of the major 
flaws of EU design law would be partially corrected.
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133  However, generally speaking, this would represent a 
rather modest improvement. It is quite clear that the 
EU design legal framework does not favour the cre-
ation of property rights around innovation. On the 
contrary, it stimulates the creation of a high number 
of bad quality monopoly rights around something 
that has not been tested for novelty or individual 
character. The very same idea that this process has 
low costs is simply wrong. The costs for innovation 
and competition are significant when the barrier to 
enter the relative markets is so high: property rights 
protecting something that may or may not be new 
since no check has been made. Especially for those 
with small or non-existent design portfolios, such a 
market is simply not attractive or accessible in the 
majority of situations.
134  In our opinion, modern, 21st-century, 3D printing, 
Fablab-based, individual or small-sized open design-
ers will find a much better tool of protection in cop-
yright. And this is bad news, as it is a clear demon-
stration that design law has failed, at least for this 
category, and that copyright is used for items that 
are closer to products than to works.
135  This brings us to a final consideration that will also 
represent our future work: How far does the concept 
of derivative work reach? This question – i.e. what 
are the boundaries of copyright protection in the 
case of modified works and products (2D to 3D and 
vice-versa) – is arguably the key point and the limit 
of the analysis we have proposed. In the case of use 
of the CCPL, this problem is tempered as the omis-
sion of the ND will generally grant the possibility to 
create derivative works. However, a clear indication 
of where to draw the line between an act of infringe-
ment (like a derivative work) and an act of inspira-
tion is crucial. Copyright law, especially in the field 
of derivative works, is absolutely not harmonized at 
the EU or at the international level, and a compara-
tive study in this field will complement the analysis 
developed in this article.
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